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Abstract 
This paper examines the relation between unemployment compensation and 
unemployment in The Netherlands. This relation is studied by means of a 
small macroeconomic model for an open economy, that assumes equilïbrium 
on the labour market and the current account. The model yields an elasticity 
of unemployment to benefits of 1.0, which is high compared to microecono-
mie research and the outcomes of disequilibrium models for The Nether-
lands. According to the model, a rise in the wedge (i.e. the difference between 
real labour cost and real net wages) leads to an increase in unemployment, 
while shifting this wedge from employers to employees induces a fall in 
unemployment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
How do unemployment benefits affect unemployment? This is the major 
problem our paper addresses. Indeed, m_JWestern European countries 
unemployment benefits and, as a corollary, unemployment insurance 
premiums or taxes are high, which may have considerable effécts on 
employment and, hence, on unemployment. For high tax and premium 
deductions are expected to reduce both the willingness to employ and to 
get employed, while high Jbenefits constitute an additional reason to 
withdraw labour supply. 
Having put forward the theoretical case we examine the size of the 
effécts. In order to gain insight into this question, we develop an equilib-
rium model for an open economy. To be more specific, we assume the 
labour market and the trade balance (or the foreign exchange market for 
that matter) to be in equilibrium. Our use of an equilibrium analysis does 
not imply that we take a stand in the equilibrium-disequilibrium debate 
between new classicals and new keynesians. Our choice of an equilibrium 
model is inspired by our desire to emphasize long-run impacts. For it is 
commonly understood that equilibrium forces are stronger in the long run 
than in the short run, although this is not an undisputed vision. However, 
in short- and medium-run analysis the choice between an equilibrium 
model and a disequilibrium model is even less made on the basis of 
empirical observation and more on the basis of a priori reasoning. For an 
exposition of this view and a juxtaposition of equilibrium models vis-a-vis 
disequilibrium models as to the labour market effécts of social security 
(with special reference to The Netherlands) we refer to Den Butter and 
Compaijen (1991). 
The model set out in this paper owes its origin to Minford (1983). 
Although our model retains its Minfordian flavour, it differs in a number 
of respects. Firstly, we neglect the distinction between a union and a non-
union sector of the labour market. This distinction, to which Minford is 
attached in view of the unionization that is so characteristic for British 
labour relations, seems less evident in Continental European countries. 
Secondly, our specification of labour demand differs from Minford's 
insofar we use a different framework of analysis. We choose for rather 
simplistic assumptions to attain as much rigour as possible in the deriva-
tions. In doing so we remain rather close to regular model building 
practice which facilitates a comparison of the results of different types of 
models (Den Butter and Compaijen, 1991). 
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Thirdly, we estimate the model with empirical data for The Netherlands. 
Our model turns out to be quite different from Minford's model for the 
British economy and the outcomes of the models preclude easy general-
izations on the relation between unemployment benefits and unemploy-
ment. 
In the next section we give an account of the theoretical model. Our point 
of departure is labour market equilibrium in a closed economy without 
unemployment insurance. lts graphical expression is formed by the well-
known 'wedge' in the labour market. Hereafter we look into the conse-
quences of introducing unemployment benefits into the model. Then we 
add the foreign sector to the model and amend the labour market rela-
tion. Finally, the section is concluded with a graphical exposition. 
The aim of section three is to specify the model equations. The coeffi-
cients of the model variables will be determined by estimation supple-
mented by a priori knowledge. 
Section 4 describes a number of simulation exercises that shed light on 
the relation between benefits and unemployment in the Dutch context. 
The final section is of a conclusive nature. 
2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
We will be rather brief about the Svedge' consisting of taxes and social 
premiums. Without levy of taxes and social premiums labour market 
equilibrium settles in the intersection of the labour demand (DD) and 
labour supply (SS) curves, see Figure 1. In this case labour demand and 
supply both depend on the equilibrating variable w, the real wage rate. 
Taxes and social premiums drive a wedge between labour demand and 
labour supply. Now DD represents the amount of labour employers are 
willing to demand in view of real labour cost. The SS curve pictures the 
labour supply of employees dependent upon the real net wage. Because 
real labour cost equals w(\ + TF), with w being the real wage (earnings) 
and TF the employers' social premium rate, the labour demand schedule 
in terms of w shifts, from DD to DD'. Equal labour demand is exercised 
at a lower real wage that, together with social premiums, adds up to equal 
real labour cost. Employees' taxes and social premiums are treated in an 
analogous way; they make SS shift to S'S'. In order to induce the same 
labour supply, net real wages should remain the same, which necessitates 
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a rise in the real wage rate. The labour supply schedule shifts upwards to 
ensure the correspondence between the real net wage (equals w(l - TJ) 
in the pre- and post-tax situations. The effect of these shifts is, of course, 
that imposing taxes and social premiums on a given wage reduces both 
labour demand and labour supply. 
w 
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Figure 1. The wedge on the labour market 
After the introduction of taxes and social premiums the real gross wage 
rate has to attain a new equilibrium value for which net real wage and 
labour cost are such that labour demand and labour supply are equal. It 
depends on the elasticity of labour demand vis-a-vis labour supply 
whether or not the post-tax wage rate differs from the pre-tax wage rate. 
A change in the equilibrium wage rate of course means that a part of the 
tax and premium burden is passed on to the other party in the labour 
market. This is more formally expressed in Dalton's law. Except in the 
case of zero elasticity of one of the two curves, after-tax employment is 
below pre-tax employment (L'0 < L0). 
Until now we have been focusing on the cost side of unemployment 
insurance. Now we switch attention to the benefits side. Unemployment 
benefits influence the shape of the supply curve of labour. Labour supply 
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is expected to be low for wages hardly exceeding benefits but rising fast 
when the gap between wages and benefits increases. For high wages, 
labour supply approaches the working age population and hardly responds 
to any further wage rise. 
In Minford's vision high unemployment benefits relative to wages dis-
courage workers to effectively supply labour because a relatively high 
unemployment benefit reduces the cost of 'leisure' to a minimum. For 
high wages labour supply is rather insensitive to an increase in wages 
which amounts to the assumption that the substitution effect and income 
effect of a wage rise approximately balance. Summing up, the elasticity of 
labour supply ranges from very high (for low wages) until zero (for high 
wages). 
w 
wD 
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Figure 2. Unemployment benefits and the labour market 
A graphical exposition of this line of reasoning is given in Figure 2. In this 
figure we assume a 'flat rate benefit' (b), i.e., a fixed amount independent 
of the wage. Of course, this is a simplification when benefits have also an 
earnings related component. However, it should be remarked that the 
effects of a proportional benefit system are weakened by the existence of 
benefit ceilings. 
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Figure 2 shows labour market equilibrium, taking the effects of unemploy-
ment insurance into account. Assuming that the labour demand curve cuts 
the labour supply curve in lts elastic part, we notice that employment is 
below the level that would be attained in the absence of unemployment 
insurance. Linking production to employment through the production 
function we can rnake a similar remark about production. Unemployment 
(Z70) is defined as the difference between the registered working age 
population (POP) and employment (L0). In accordance with the equilib-
rium character of the model this unemployment can be viewed as volun-
tary unemployment. Assumedly, voluntary unemployment is increased by 
the social security system in two ways, its generosity on the one hand and 
its accompanying expenses on the other hand. 
In an open economy things are more complicated. In this type of economy 
long run equilibrium is required in order to prevent foreign currency 
shortage. For that reason we impose the condition of balance of payments 
equilibrium in addition to equilibrium on the labour market and the 
goods market1. Neglecting capital flows we demand the current account 
to be in equilibrium with the real exchange rate as equiiibrating variable. 
The three markets we distinguish in the open economy are intercon-
nected. The current account or the foreign exchange market and the 
product market are tied to each other through the volume of production 
because imports are more or less proportional to production, apart from 
limited substitution possibilities. 
The foreign exchange market and the labour market are also intertwined. 
The real exchange rate is capable of driving consumption prices and 
production prices apart, creating a wedge between the real product wage 
and the real consumption wage. Consequently, a change in the terms-of-
trade may enhance or dirninish the tax and premium wedge on the labour 
market. Hereafter we present the model in full. 
We start with the labour market and the product market. Labour demand 
U is a function of the real product wage (to be defined hereafter), capital 
K, and a time trend t that represents technological progress etc. The real 
1
 In the model goods market equilibrium is implicit by the assumption 
that production is related to the equilibrium volume of labour by means 
of the production function. Because the volumes of exports and imports 
are determined within the model, consumption and investment expendi-
ture act as balancing items. 
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product wage is made up of gross wages (eamings) and taxes and social 
premiums on labour paid by employers, this sum being deflated by the 
production price index. Thus, with W representing the nominal wage rate, 
TF the employers' social premium rate on wages and Py the production 
price index, labour demand is described by 
y 
Labour supply is dependent upon the real consumption wage which we 
obtain by subtracting employees' taxes and social premiums from gross 
wages and deflating the remainder with the consumption price index. 
Moreover, real benefits b influence labour supply. Our provisional labour 
supply equation is given by: 
L'-h^R,b) (2) 
In this equation U represents labour supply, TL the employees' tax and 
social premium rate on gross wages and Pd the domestic price level. A 
divergence of the variables Py and Pd causing a gap between the real 
product wage and the real consumption wage may arise as a consequence 
of terms-of-trade changes. Define the real exchange rate e as: 
rP. P 
e = ' - * ' (3) 
Here r represents the nominal exchange rate (of the own currency vis-a-
vis foreign currencies), Pf the price index of foreign prices (in foreign 
currency) and Pm (= Pf/r) the price index of imports (in the own cur-
rency). A decline of the real exchange rate is equivalent to a rise of 
competitiveness vis-a-vis foreign countries. 
Assuming that the import share (or import coëfficiënt M/Y) does not 
fluctuate very much we can make profitable use of an approximation for 
the production price index: 
p 0 +/0 
Pv = _ £ — = PJB* (4) 
y p? d 
In this equation p. denotes the average import share. When the real 
exchange rate does not change, production prices and selling prices (the 
6 
domestic price level concerns consumption, investment and exports) move 
parallel. A rise in the real exchange rate makes production prices rise 
faster than selling prices. Substitüting equation (4) into equation (1) and 
defining the real wage rate w as W/Pd we can simplify equations (1) and 
(2) into 
LWXl+I^e-» ,* ,*) (5) 
L< *f2(w(l-TL),b) (6) 
To these two equations we add the condition for labour market equilib-
rium 
L * - L ' (7) 
and nest we let the volume of production Q be determined by the produc-
tion fu net ion: 
Q - ƒ,<£.' ,K,t) (8) 
The system of four equations (5) through (8) contains five unknown 
variables (Ld, U, w, Q, e) which means that it is not determined. The sol-
ution that comes into mind is to let the real exchange rate be determined 
by equilibrium in the foreign exchange market, taking into account export 
opportunities and import needs. Let us note that there is no equation for 
the absolute level of prices, although this could easily be brought into the 
model. Apparently, in this model goods market equilibrium is assured 
without explicitly relying on the clearing function of prices. 
We mm move on to the foreign exchange market. The volume of exports 
and the volume of imports both are related to a scale variable, world 
trade UT and production Q respectively, and a relative price variable, the 
real exchange rate e. The higher the real exchange rate, the lower exports 
and the higher imports. However, the price sensitivity of exports may 
exceed that of imports. For the volume of exports x and the volume of 
import* m we write down: 
x « f.MIT.e) (9) 
and 
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m = fs(Q,e) (10) 
The two equations can be combined into one by using the condition for 
current account equilibrium: 
Pd.x = Pn.m (11) 
or, in view of equation (3), 
e.x = m (Ha) 
Substitution of equation (9) and equation (10) into equation (11a) gives a 
relation between the endogenous variables e and Q, via 
e=f6(Q,WT) (12) 
In order to maintain current account equilibrium a higher production, 
which requires extra imports, should be accompanied with a lower value 
of the real exchange rate to encourage exports and reduce imports. 
The five equations (5), (6), (7), (8) and (12) constitute the complete 
model which can be solved for the five unknowns Ld, U, Q, w and e. 
Following Minford we present a graphical solution in Figure 3. We start 
with the labour market. Labour demand is a function of the endogenous 
variables w and e. For any value of e labour demand is considered a 
declining function of w. This is in line with the closed-economy demand 
curve shown in the Figures 1 and 2. A rise of e brings about an outward 
shift of this labour demand curve. With a higher value of e more labour is 
demanded at the same wage because of increased profitability. Labour 
supply, on the other hand, is a rising function of w and depends upon no 
other endogenous variables. For the moment we can leave aside changes 
in the exogenous variables among which the instrument variables Tp, TL 
and b. The condition for labour market equilibrium does not give us the 
equilibrium value of the wage rate. As yet we cannot get any further than 
determining the EW relation, combinations of e and w for which the 
labour market clears. This is shown in quadrant II. Let us suppose EW is 
linear. This EW line expresses a positive correlation between w and e. A 
higher value of e entails a higher demand of labour which necessitates a 
higher wage rate. 
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Figure 3. Internal and external equilibrium 
We continue with the determination of production Q. Any value of e 
corresponds with a value of Q. The graphical derivation is shown in 
Figure 3. Choose a value of e. According to the EW relation, for this 
value of e there is only one value of w that guarantees labour market 
equilibrmm. Once we know the equilibrium wage, we have an easy job in 
determining employment via the labour supply function and hence 
production by means of the production function. The resulting OS curve 
in quadrant I is a kind of supply curve and pictures the supply of goods 
for the collection of possible labour market equilibria. 
The supply curve OS is matched with the demand curve FF. This demand 
curve represents pairs of (Q, e) belonging to current account equilibrium. 
The FF curve is the graphical counterpart of equation (12) which we dis-
cussed before. 
General equilibrium (in the limited sense of this macroeconomic model) 
occurs in the intersection of the FF curve and the OS curve. In Figure 3 
the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables, which can now be 
determined, are represented by a subscript 0. It is not until now that we 
know the location of the labour market equilibrium in quadrant II. The 
9 
figure is completed by drawing the labour demand curve for the equilib-
rium value of e (dashed line). Finally, note that a change of the instru-
ments influencing the position of the Ld or U curve causes a shift of the 
EW curve and hence of the OS curve. 
3. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF THE 
MODEL 
This section aims at specifying the model discussed in the previous section 
in such a way that we can obtain estimates for The Netherlands. In doing 
so we make some departures from the theoretical model. We start with 
labour demand. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology and profit-maximiz-
ing behaviour of entrepreneurs we can specify labour demand to be a 
loglinear relation of the real product wage and the capital stock to which 
relation a time trend is added (see Appendix 1). Because of lack of data 
of the capital stock we suppose it grows exponentially. We let the time 
trend capture the effects of capital growth besides technological progress. 
We add production as an explanatory variable. The theoretical justifica-
tion in the context of the equilibrium model is that the real exchange rate 
(being a constituent of the real product wage) may be replaced by produc-
tion as a consequence of the OS curve. The production variable also takes 
account of output constraints on labour demand. In doing so we follow 
the practice of empirical research on labour demand (cf. Springer, Vijlb-
rief and Compaijen, 1988, and Den Butter, 1991). 
In labour market equilibrium we can interpret the labour demand equa-
tion as an unemployment equation. For, in equilibrium: 
L" * L' = POP-U (13) 
POP de noting the labour force and U equilibrium unemployment. The un-
employment rate is now approximated by the equation: 
JL - - ln(il l) (14) 
POP POP 
The unemployment equation then reads: 
JL « cr0 + a . lnKl+T;)] - a2lnö + <V (15) 
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Apart from the sign, the coefficients ax and a2 correspond respectively to 
the wage elasticity and production elasticity of labour demand2. The 
coëfficiënt a3 includes the effects óf technological progress, capital growth 
and labour force growth. The estimation on yearly data over the period 
1961-1988 results in (see Appendix 2 for more information on the estima-
tions): 
JL = const
 + 0.441n[w(l+7»] ^  - 0.48Ö.» (i6) 
+ 0.004? + 0.03duml 
The implied elasticities of labour demand to real wage costs and produc-
tion are in line with other empirical research for The Netherlands (see 
Den Butter, 1991). In order to get usable estimation results, a dummy for 
the restructuring of the Dutch industry during the eighties was added to 
the unemployment equation (see Appendix 2, and Springer, Vijlbrief and 
Compaijen, 1988). 
Next we turn to labour supply. Using the assumption of equilibrium on 
the labour market, labour supply equation (6) can be transformed to a 
loglinear relation between the unemployment rate on the one hand and 
wages and benefits on the other3. In order to obtain a normalized model, 
the (gross) wage rate is used as the dependent variable. The estimated 
wage equation becomes: 
lnw = const - 0.05 I n - i L + 0.28 lnö . (17) 
POP "' 
This equation enables us to calculate the elasticities of labour supply with 
respect to the level of wages and benefits. The former elasticity can be 
approximated by the reciprocal of the coëfficiënt of the unemployment 
rate in the wage equation times the unemployment rate. The implied 
average wage elasticity of labour supply for The Netherlands during the 
period 1960-1988 is 1.30, which is quite high compared with other empiri-
cal findings (see for example Theeuwes, 1988). According to equation (17) 
2
 In order to calculate the real wage we used the consumption price 
index as deflator in equation (15) and elsewhere. 
3
 If labour supply is derived from the maximization of a CES utility 
function in income and leisure, this also yields a loglinear equation for the 
unemployment rate including wages and the (relative) level of benefits 
(see Vijlbrief, 1992, pp. 171-172). 
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the average elasticity of labour supply to the level of unemployment 
benefits is -0.36 over the period 1960-1988. Estimates of a roughly similar 
wage equation for the United Kingdom by Minford (1983) give a higher 
elasticity of labour supply to the level of benefits (-0.6). In Section 4 the 
importance of this elasticity for the relation between unemployment and 
benefits will be further examined. 
In the foregoing we departed from the theoretical model by including 
production in the labour demand function and dropping the production 
function. In order to retain a complete model we need a replacing 
equation. We follow Minford and introducé an independent EW relation 
by referring to pricing behaviour4. 
We start from the price (= marginal cost) equation: 
lnPd = \[ln(W(l+TF)) - ïnx] + (l-X)lnPm (18) 
in which X is the share of labour cost in total cost and x is labour produc-
tivity (the variable W(l + TF)/x represents labour cost per unit of output). 
Remembering the definition of the real exchange rate, we write it in loga-
rithmic form as: 
Ine = hxP. - IÏLP (19) 
O m 
After some manipulation we obtain: 
Ine = <*>0 + ^ l n M l + 7 » ] - 4>7t (20) 
For further details we refer to Appendix 1. The estimation equation 
reads: 
Ine « const + 0.65 In [w (1+7»] - 0.02t + Q21dum2 (21) 
The elasticity of the real exchange rate to real wage costs is rather small, 
compared to the estimations of the Minford-model for the United King-
dom but is close to the comparable elasticity for Germany (see Minford, 
1983, and Minford and Davis, 1989). The dummy reflects the strong rise 
in the Dutch real exchange rate since 1986 (for further details, see 
Appendix 2). 
4
 Note, that the EW relation in the theoretical model is a derived one 
and not independent of the structural equations forming the model. 
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The equations for labour demand (equation (16)) and labour supply 
(equation (17)) determine together with the relation between real 
exchange rate and real wage rate (equation (21)) the supply curve 
labelled OS in Figure 3. To be able to determine the open economy's 
equilibrium position we have to close the model by deriving the equation 
for the demand curve FF, i.e. the curve entailing a balanced current 
account. To this we turn now. 
For exports and imports we use loglinear specifications, implying constant 
elasticities. The exports equation reads: 
In* = 70 + 7jlnWT - 72lne (22) 
whilst the imports equation is in the same vein: 
lnm = 80 + 3,lnÖ + 52lne (23) 
The condition for equilibrium on current account (equation (11)) reads 
logarithmically: 
Ine + lnx = lnm 
(24) 
Substitution of equation (22) and equation (23) into equation (24) gives a 
relation between the endogenous variables e and Q. We rewrite this 
equation to let Q be the dependent variable: 
lnö - ^ ^ + 2ilnWT - i L ^ l I l n e (25) 
If the sum of the price elasticities of exports and imports exceeds one (i.e. 
72 + 82 > 1) the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied. We then have an 
inverse relationship between Q and e. The higher the real exchange rate, 
the lower is the level of income which maintains equilibrium on current 
account. The estimation results are discussed next. 
For exports we find5: 
lnx = const + 1.08In WT - 0.84Ine 1 (26) 
'1 
and for imports: 
5
 In the estimated export equation, the real exchange rate is defined 
as the price level of exports divided by the price level of competitors. 
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lnw = cortst + 1.521nö + 0.271ne 1 
"7 
(27) 
The elasticities of exports and imports to the scale variables, world trade 
and production respectively, are in agreement with or somewhat larger 
than the values usually found for The Netherlands. This does not apply to 
the elasticities to the relative price variable, the real exchange rate. They 
are both much smaller than the elasticities which are used in the large, 
macroeconomic policy models for The Netherlands, such as Freia-Kompas 
of the Central Planning Bureau. On the basis of the estimation results the 
equation of the FF curve reads: 
InQ « const + 0.71 InWT - 0.071ne (28) 
Compared with the estimations by Minford (1983) and Minford and Davis 
(1989) for the United Kingdom and Germany, the elasticity of the produc-
tion to the real exchange rate is indeed very small in The Netherlands. 
We return to the implications of this in Section 4. 
4. BENEFITS AND UNEMPLOYMENT: SOME 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
A dynamic simulation of the four endogenous variables in the model - the 
unemployment rate, wages, the real exchange rate and production - over 
the period 1962-1988 shows that the equilibrium model is quite capable to 
describe the past adequately. Figure 4 shows realized and simulated 
unemployment in The Netherlands between 1962 and 1988. Dutch unem-
ployment is overestimated by the model during the sixties and the begin-
ning of the seventies. After 1973 the sharp increase in unemployment 
until 1984 is reasonably described by the model. 
Although our principal interest concerns the relation between unemploy-
ment and the benefit level in The Netherlands, we first shortly examine 
the impact of a change in external demand conditions by an impulse 
simulation. The impulse simulations of this section are carried out by 
giving a permanent and autonomous shock in an exogenous variable over 
the period 1982-1988, after which the effect of the impulse is measured as 
the difference from the baseline projection by the model over that period. 
According to the model, a rise in world trade by 10 percent has consider-
able long-run effects on unemployment (-129,000), wages (+1.3 percent), 
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Figure 4. Realized and simulated unemployment (in 1000 persons) in the 
Netherlands between 1962 and 1988 
the real exchange rate ( + 0.9 percent) and production (+7.0 percent)6. 
There is a striking difference between the impact on unemployment and 
production of a rise in world trade, according to the current 'Minfordian' 
equilibrium model and other examples of equilibrium models for The 
Netherlands. For example, Vijlbrief (1992, pp. 130-131) finds almost 
negligible effects of a rise in world trade, which can be explained by 
goods supply being rather insensitive to changes in the real exchange rate 
in that equilibrium model. 
We now turn to impulse simulations to shed some light on the central 
problem of this paper, i.e., the effect of unemployment benefits and their 
financing on unemployment. Table 1 shows the long-run impact of four 
policy variants. A permanent reduction in unemployment benefits by 10 
percent leads to an increase in economie activity and a fall in unemploy-
6
 When discussing the results of the impulse simulations, we will only 
give attention to the long-run effects (after 7 years). The short-run impact 
does not differ much from this long-run impact. 
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ment, wages and the real exchange rate. The cut in benefits raises labour 
supply, which leads to a fall in wages to secure labour market equilibrium. 
Employment is increased, which leads to a rise in production7. To main-
tain equilibrium on the current account, the real exchange rate has to fall. 
A reduction by 5 percent points in the burden of taxes and social pre-
miums for employees also has favourable, though smaller, effects which 
work through the same mechanisms as described above. A cut in the 
social security burden for employers by 5 percent points reduces labour 
costs, which induces an upward shift in labour demand. This leads to 
more employment and higher wages. The accompanying rise in production 
makes a fall in the real exchange rate necessary again. 
Table 1 : Long-run effects of four policy variants (in % of the baseline 
jrojection, except unemployment (in 1000 persons)) 
unemploy-
ment (U) 
real 
wages (w) 
real 
exchange 
rate (e) 
produc-
tion (ö) 
reduction by 10 % in unem-
ployment benefits 
-54 -2.4 -1.5 0.1 
reduction by 5 %-points in 
employees' burden 
-18 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 
reduction by 5 %-points in 
employers' burden 
-75 0.7 -2.1 0.1 
shift in burden by 5 %-points 
in burden from employers to 
employees 
-57 1.5 -1.7 0.1 
The two tax policies which we discussed above suffer from a lack of 
realism because the financing is not considered explicitly. The bottom row 
of Table 1 gives the results of a policy variant which is, approximately, 
balanced-budget. According to our model, a shift in the burden of taxes 
and social security premiums from employers to employees by 5 percent 
points has favourable effects on employment in The Netherlands. As the 
7
 One result of this impulse simulation which is both surprising and 
hard to explain is the difference between the effect of the cut in benefits 
on employment ( ± 1 percent) and production (only 0.1 percent). One 
possible explanation is the very small elasticity of production to the real 
exchange rate in equation (28). In a sensitivity analysis we further exam-
ine this point. 
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model is symmetrical with regard to an increase or decrease in tax rates, 
the effect of the shift in the burden is equal to the results of row 2 
subtracted from row 3. 
From these impulse simulations we may conclude that both the level of 
unemployment benefits and their financing influence unemployment and 
economie activity in The Netherlands. According to the model, the long-
run elasticity of unemployment to the level of benefits is 1.0 (see also row 
1 in Table 2). Microeconomic studies for The Netherlands and other 
countries (see for example Van den Berg (1990), Nickell (1979) and Solon 
(1985)) usually find a smaller elasticity of approximately 0.5. The elasticity 
in the current model is of the same order of magnitude as Vijlbrief (1992, 
p. 159) finds in another equilibrium model for The Netherlands, but it is 
much smaller than the elasticity of 2.8, found by Minford (1983) for the 
United Kingdom. As we argue in Section 3, this difference may be 
(partly) due to the smaller benefit elasticity of labour supply as implied by 
our wage equation for The Netherlands. Therefore we examine the effect 
of doubling the coëfficiënt of the unemployment benefit level in wage 
equation (17), which implies that the elasticity of labour supply to the 
level of benefits becomes -0.72. Row 2 of Table 2 shows the outcome of 
this sensitivity analysis. 
Table 2 : Long-run model elasticities of unemployment to the level of 
benefits, according to the central variant and two alternative versions 
Model elasticity of unemployment to the 
level of benefits 
Central variant (wage equation (17)) 1.0 
Alternative wage equation (doubled bene-
fit elasticity of labour supply) 
1.7 
Alternative production equation (elasticity 
of production to real exchange rate is 
-0.25) 
1.2 
A comparison of row 1 and 2 clearly shows that the benefit elasticity of 
labour supply is crucial for the relation between benefits and unemploy-
ment in The Netherlands. The impact on unemployment of a change in 
the benefit level may also be affected by the sensitivity of goods demand 
to changes in the real exchange rate. To understand this, we must return 
to the graphical analysis of the model in Section 2. When the demand 
curve FF is inelastic, production and employment are largely determined 
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by extemal conditions. In such a situation, a shift in the supply curve OS 
(for example caused by a change in benefits) will not have much effect on 
unemployment. In our equilibrium model, the elasticity of production to 
the real exchange rate is indeed very small, as indicated by equation (28). 
Therefore, we consider the effect of increasing this elasticity from -0.07 in 
the central variant to -0.25 in an alternative equation for production. The 
bottom row of Table 2 confirms that the relation between benefits and 
unemployment is affected by the change in the production equation8. 
We briefly return to our results on the unemployment effects of the 
financing of unemployment benefits. The effects on economie activity and 
unemployment of a reduction in the tax and social security burden for 
employees are much smaller than in other equilibrium models for The 
Netherlands (compare Van Sinderen, 1990, Den Butter and Compaijen, 
1991, and Vijlbrief, 1992). Minford (1983, p. 237) finds an elasticity of 
unemployment to a 1 percent point change in the employees' burden of 
2.8 for the United Kingdom, while the current model for The Netherlands 
yields an elasticity of 0.7. With regard to a reduction in the employers' 
burden of social security premiums, the elasticity of unemployment is 2.9 
for The Netherlands, whereas the elasticity for the United Kingdom is 5.9 
(see Minford, 1983, p. 237). 
This section closes with a cliometric simulation, in which we investigate 
what would have happened if the Dutch government had not made some 
severe cuts in unemployment benefits in the eighties. Between 1983 and 
1988, the replacement ratio (the ratio between net unemployment insur-
ance benefits and net wages) was reduced from 85.7 to 78.6 percent. 
Table 3 shows the difference between the baseline projection and the 
model solution, fixing the replacement ratio at its 1983 level9. According 
to our model, Dutch unemployment would have been higher in the 
eighties if (relative) benefit levels had not been reduced. Real wages and 
the real exchange rate would have been higher too in the absence of the 
benefit reduction, whereas production would have been smaller. 
8
 When this alternative production equation is used, the difference 
between the effect of a change in benefits on employment vs. production, 
as described in an earlier footnote, is somewhat reduced: in the alterna-
tive version of the model a 10 percent cut in benefits increases employ-
ment by 1.3 and production by 0.4 percent. 
9
 We report the results from 1985 since the benefit level influences 
the rest of the economy with a one year lag (see equation (17)). 
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Tahle 3 : The impact of fixing the replacement ratio at its 1983 level (in 
% of the baseline projection, except unemployment (in 1000)) 
unemploy-
ment (U) 
real 
wages (w) 
real 
exchange 
rate (e) 
produc-
tion ( 0 
1985 0 0.6 0.4 0.0 
1986 13 2.2 1.4 -0.1 
1987 47 2.0 1.3 -0.1 
1988 44 2.0 1.3 -0.1 
5. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to measure the effect of unemployment benefits 
and their financing on unemployment in The Netherlands. Although much 
research has been done on the relation between the benefit level and 
individual durations of unemployment, the macroeconomic impact of 
unemployment compensation has received less attention. This paper uses 
a rather specific equilibrium framework to examine the unemployment 
effect of benefits. A 'Minfordian' model, that assumes equilibrium on the 
labour market and on the current account, is estimated for The Nether-
lands. Estimation of the wage equation for The Netherlands, which is in 
fact a rewritten labour supply equation, yields a quite modest elasticity of 
labour supply to the level of benefits. This stands in contrast with the 
results for such an equation for the United Kingdom (see Minford, 1983). 
The major part of the estimated coefficients is in agreement with earlier 
empirical research for The Netherlands. There are, however, some excep-
tions: the wage elasticity of labour supply seems to be unrealistically high, 
and exports and imports are not sensitive enough with regard to the real 
exchange rate. 
The relation between benefits and unemployment in The Netherlands is 
investigated by means of impulse simulations. In general, equilibrium 
models yield larger effects of unemployment benefits on economie activity 
than models which assume a non-clearing labour market (see Den Butter 
and Compaijen, 1991, and Vijlbrief, 1992). The current equilibrium model 
is no exception to this general rule, although the benefit elasticity of 
unemployment of 1.0 for The Netherlands is much smaller than the 
elasticity of 2.8 found for the United Kingdom by Minford (1983). How-
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ever, compared to the microeconomic research and macroeconomic diseq-
uilibrium models for The Netherlands, the current model gives relatively 
large effects of benefits on unemployment. According to the model, the 
financing of the benefits by employers' and employees' social security 
contributions also increases unemployment in The Netherlands. The 
impact of employers' premiums is much larger than that of the burden for 
employees, which implies that shifting the 'wedge' from employers to 
employees has favourable effects on employment in The Netherlands. 
A sensitivity analysis indicates that the relation between benefits and 
unemployment in The Netherlands is quite dependent on some of the 
parameters of the model. For example, the benefit elasticity of labour 
supply is a crucial determinant of the impact of benefits on unemploy-
ment. We have also shown that the elasticity of production to the real 
exchange rate is important for the size of the effect of unemployment 
benefits. Where does this leave us with regard to the central question of 
this paper? First, not surprisingly, the jnqdeJ[_confirms that the unemploy-
ment compensation system does influence unemployment in The Nether-
lands. Secondly, it can be doubted whether the current equilibrium model 
is most suited to give reliable estimates of the size of this impact. In the 
present labour market situation in The Netherlands, the equilibrium 
assumption may not be realistic and, consequently, the elasticity of 
unemployment to benefits may be smaller than indicated in this paper. 
However, if the Dutch labour market shows a long-run tendency to more 
flexibility, the relevance of the current model for measuring the impact of 
benefits on unemployment will increase. 
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APPENDK 1 : THE DERIVAHON OF LABOUR DEMAND AND 
THE EW-RELATION 
Labour demand 
Take as a starting point the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
Ö = cie^LyK1'" <a) 
a = labour elasticity of production 
X = rade of Harrod-neutral tecnical progress 
In an equilibrium model profit maximization requires equality of the real 
product wage and the marginal product of labour, or: 
w(l+Tp)e-> = ^ £ = aceaX'La'lKl-a (b) 
F
 BL 
Rewriting and taking logarithms of equation (b) yields the labour demand 
equation: 
InL" = C - _i_ln[w(l+rF)e-"] + \nK + _£LXf (c) 
1-a 1-a 
The EW-relation 
The price of output is an average of labour cost per unit of product and 
import cost, so: 
\nPd = c + \[\n(W(l+TF)) - lux] + (l-\)lnPm (d) 
X = share of labour cost in price 
(1-X) = share of import cost in price 
x = labour productivity 
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From the definition of e = Pd/Pm: 
Ine = InP, - lnP 
a m 
Substitute equation (d) into equation (e): 
Ine = c + Xln(PT(l+rF)) - XlnPm - Xlnx 
or, substituting PJe for Pm: 
Ine = c + Xln(W(l + TF)) - XlnPd + Xlne - Xlnx 
(l-X)lne = c + \[ln(W(l+TF)) - InPJ- Xmx 
or: 
Ine = — + J^_ ln(w( l+n) ) - _*- lnx 
1-X 1-X V V p)) 1-X 
w being defined as W/Pd. 
Assuming that labour productivity is steadily growing, we 
relation to be estimated: 
Ine = tf>0 + <^1ln[w(l+r/r)] - <t>2t 
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APPENDIX 2 : ESHMATES 
The equations are estimated by two-stage-least-squares, using the 
exogenous and predetermined variables as instruments. The ar(l)- and 
ma(l)-values represent a first-order autoregressive or moving average 
process in the disturbances. T-values are given between parentheses. Q5 is 
the Ljung-Box statistic for autocorrelation up to order 5, which has a x2 
distribution. Duml is a dummy that reflects the extraordinary loss in 
employment during 1981-1983, caused by the restructuring of Dutch 
industry (duml is zero between 1960 and 1980, one in 1981, 2 in 1982, 
and 3 during 1983-1988). Dum2 is a dummy to represent the high level of 
the real exchange rate since 1986, which cannot be explained by the 
development in real wage costs, nor by the time trend (dum2 is 1 during 
1986-1988). 
JL. = 0.16 + 0.441^^(1+7»]^ - 0.482.,+ 0.004 f + 0.03duml 
(1.36) (8.81) (-7.39) (2.91) (9.77) 
estimation period : 1961-1988 
R2 = 0.989 SEE = 0.006 DW = 1.65 Qs = 2.04 
lnw = 3.30 - 0.051n-^_ + 0.28 Inb , 
POP _1 
(6.79) (-2.26) (2.61) 
estimation period : 1962-1988 
W = 0.996 SEE = 0.016 ar{\) = 0.94 DW = 1.78 Q5 = 6.11 
Ine = -2.60 + 0.65 In [w (1+7»] - 0.02t + 021dum2 
(-6.03) (5.82) (-4.07) (5.84) 
estimation period : 1961 - 1988 
R2 = 0.811 SEE = 0.053 ma(\) = 0.64 DW = 2.12 Qs = 1.70 
25 
hrc = -0.30 + 1.081nWT - 0.84Ine i 
"7 
(-1.13) (19.07) (-3.09) 
estimation period : 1962 - 1988 
R2 - 0.999 SEE = 0.020 ar(l) = 0.80 DW = 1.92 Qs - 4.36 
lnm = -2.37 + 1.521nö + 0.271ne i 
(-8.37) (23.63) (2.43) 
estimationperiod : 1962 - 1988 
F = 0.997 SEE = 0.023 ar{\) = 0.61 ZJÏF = 1.95 Q5 = 7.21 
